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KICKING THE LAW: THE EFFECTS OF
FIFA REGULATIONS ON A WORLD CUP
HOST COUNTRY’S LEGISLATIVE
PROCESS IN REGARDS TO
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
PROTECTION
INTRODUCTION
ver three billion people around the world tuned in to
watch the 2018 World Cup,
1
an international football
tournament that increasingly attracts viewers from across the
globe.
2
The Fédération Internationale de Football Association
(FIFA) is football’s leading international governing body.
3
It
organizes the tournament and selects the country to host the
World Cup, which takes place every four years.
4
Preparations
for the event take many years, and the host country is chosen
well in advance after careful consideration.
5
The bidding pro-
cess to select a host country alone takes approximately two
years
6
due to the rigorous requirements for hosting the tour-
1. Mark Fleming, WORLD CUP IN NUMBERS World Cup 2018 Final in
Numbers: Global TV Audience, Fifa’s Revenue and Cost of Hosting tourna-
ment, SUN (July 16, 2018), https://www.thesun.co.uk/world-cup-
2018/6782884/world-cup-2018-final-in-numbers/ (citing data from Global-
WebIndex).
2. Football is known in the United States as soccer. This article will refer
to the sport as football since it is known as such in the international commu-
nity. Adam Reed, Half the world’s population tuned in to this year’s soccer
World Cup, CNBC (Dec. 21, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/12/21/world-
cup-2018-half-the-worlds-population-tuned-in-to-this-years-soccer-
tournament.html.
3. About FIFA, FIFA, https://www.fifa.com/aboutfifa/worldcup/index.html
(last visited Aug. 26, 2019).
4. The FIFA World Cup is held for the adult men’s national teams. There
are separate tournaments for women and other age groups. See id.
5. To give a more concrete example, the bidding process for the 2018 and
2022 World Cup tournaments began as early as 2009. See Ewan Macdonald,
World Cup Bidding Process Explained: How the 2018 & 2022 World Cup
Hosts Are Chosen, GOAL (Nov. 29, 2010),
https://www.goal.com/en/news/3512/20182022-world-cup-
host/2010/11/29/2234600/world-cup-bidding-process-explained-how-the-2018-
2022-world.
6. This is the projected timeline for the 2026 World Cup, which is compa-
rable to previous tournaments’ bidding processes. FIFA, GUIDE TO THE
O
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nament, such as maintaining sustainable event management,
organizing on-site security, and upholding human rights
standards.
7
FIFA outlines these requirements as “important
guarantees requested from governments,”
8
meaning that if a
potential host country’s government fails to abide by a request
from FIFA, then the requirements to host will not be met and
FIFA will subsequently remove the bid.
9
One of the more challenging requirements FIFA mandates is
the protection of commercial rights.
10
According to this re-
quirement, the host country “must acknowledge FIFA’s unre-
stricted and inclusive ownership of any commercial rights” as-
sociated with the World Cup.
11
These rights come in the form of
trademarks and copyrights as FIFA strives to protect its brand
from infringement and exploitation by unauthorized entities or
individuals.
12
Due to this strict requirement, host countries
face legal challenges in the form of changing or enacting laws
in a short amount of time in order to fully comply with FIFA’s
intellectual property regulations.
13
BIDDING PROCESS FOR THE 2026 FIFA WORLD CUP 12 (2018),
https://img.fifa.com/image/upload/hgopypqftviladnm7q90.pdf.
7. Id. at 25.
8. This part of the document provides a brief summary of the government
support required to host the tournament and includes short descriptions of
some of the guarantees. Id. at 29.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Intellectual Property, FIFA, https://www.fifa.com/about-
fifa/marketing/brand-protection/intellectual-property.html (last visited Aug.
26, 2019).
13. Roberto Lusardi, Qatar 2022 World Cup- Laws, Changes and Legacy
Benefits, LAWINSPORT (June 21, 2018),
https://www.lawinsport.com/content/articles/item/qatar-2022-world-cup-laws-
changes-and-legacy-
bene-
fits?highlight=WyJjaGFuZ2VzIiwiY2hhbmciLCJjaGFuZydzIiwibGVnYWN5Ii
wicWF0YXIiLCJxYXRhcidzIiwiJ3FhdGFyIiwicWF0YXInLCIsIidxYXRhcidzIi
wyMDIyLCIyMDIyJywiLCIyMDIyJyIsIjIwMjIncyIs-
IndvcmxkIiwid29ybGQncyIsIid3b3JsZCIsIndvcmxkJywiLCJ3b3JsZCciLCJ3b
3JsZCcuIiwid29ybGQnc2xhcmdlc3QiLCJjdXAiLCJjdXAnIiwiY3VwJ3MiLCJj
dXAnLCI-
sImN1cCcuIiwibGF3cyIsImxhdyIsImxhdycuIiwibGF3JyIsImxhdycsIiwiJ2xh
dy-
IsImxhdydzIiwibGF3Jy1qYWNrIiwiJ2xhdyciLCInbGF3J3MiLCJiZW5lZml0c
yIsIm-
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FIFA understands that imposing legislative requirements on
host countries is pertinent to protecting its brand and image.
14
Much of this legal restructuring stems from the need to avoid
conflict between local laws and FIFA requirements.
15
As people
engage in business or travel in the host country during the
World Cup, they will need to comply with the laws of that
country at any given time.
16
For example, if a person were to
utilize the FIFA brand to sell counterfeit goods and the host
country had no law against such action, then FIFA’s brand
would be threatened and infringement cases would be difficult
to pursue.
17
This issue has forced countries to create special police units
and judicial courts devoted solely to investigating cases of in-
fringement, ambush marketing, and counterfeited goods, as
well as enact legislation that allows government officials to
monitor and penalize anyone guilty of such conduct.
18
FIFA
takes aggressive action towards protecting its brand because of
the high intellectual property²based revenue brought in from
each tournament.
19
To better illustrate FIFA’s need to imple-
ment these strict regulations, it is best to look at some of the
revenue brought in from the most recent World Cup in 2018.
20
FIFA earned $3 billion in television broadcast rights and $1.65
billion in marketing rights, which together make up more than
half of the approximate $6.1 billion total earned in revenue by
JlbmVmaXQiLCInYmVuZWZpdCciLCJiZW5lZml0J3MiLCInYmVuZWZpdCc
uIiwiYmVuZWZpdCcsIiwiJ2JlbmVmaXQnLDIyIiwicWF0YXIgMjAyMiIsInFh
dGFyIDI-
wMjIgd29ybGQiLCIyMDIyIHdvcmxkIiwiMjAyMiB3b3JsZCBjdXAiLCJ3b3Js
ZCBjdXAiLCJ3b3JsZCBjdXAgbGF3cyIsImN1cCBsYXdzIl0=.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Arrest or Detention of a U.S. Citizen Abroad, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE ²
BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS,
https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/international-
travel/emergencies/arrest-detention.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2019).
17. See Intellectual Property, supra note 12.
18. Ambush marketing is a controversial type of marketing where a com-
pany attempts to take advantage of a competitor’s advertising during an
event to promote its own goods or services. Lusardi, supra note 13.
19. Intellectual Property, supra note 12.
20. Kurt Badenhausen, FIFA World Cup 2018: The Money Behind The
Biggest Event In Sports, FORBES (June 14, 2018),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/kurtbadenhausen/2018/06/14/world-cup-2018-
the-money-behind-the-biggest-event-in-sports/#493a0aa76973.
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FIFA from the tournament.
21
To eliminate any risk of losing
brand protection and revenue, FIFA strongly encourages non-
affiliated entities to refrain from associating themselves with
FIFA or the World Cup, especially when it concerns activities
involving or impacting FIFA’s intellectual property rights.
22
This Note will examine the complex relationship between
FIFA and a World Cup host country, particularly the ways
those countries approach legislative reform in light of the rigid
requirements set by football’s international governing body.
This analysis will shed light on what the previous host coun-
tries have done to accommodate FIFA, including enacting and
amending local intellectual property laws aimed at providing
FIFA with full brand protection within their territories.
23
Countries will continue to face the pressure of lengthy legal
challenges since laws and regulations take time to come into
effect. As such, this Note will argue that FIFA should provide
assistance to host countries in the form of a separate committee
devoted solely to assisting local governments’ legislative pro-
cesses in accommodating FIFA’s requirements. Furthermore,
signatories to international intellectual property treaties and
agreements should add provisions that provide for a better
platform to address infringement claims that threaten FIFA’s
exclusive rights within the boundaries of a host country. This
will not only benefit FIFA, but also host countries that are
members of FIFA and signatories to such international treaties
because those countries also benefit economically from the
World Cup.
24
Part I of this Note provides an overview of FIFA and its intel-
lectual property regulations as they relate to World Cup host
countries. It will also provide an overview of international in-
tellectual property treaties and agreements with an emphasis
on copyright and trademark protection. Part II will analyze the
21. Id.
22. FIFA, GUIDELINES FOR THE USE OF FIFA’S OFFICIAL MARKS 6 (Apr.
2018), https://resources.fifa.com/image/upload/2018-fifa-world-cup-public-
guidelines-guidelines-for-the-use-of-fifa-s-official-
.pdf?cloudid=uoetxbjs803ft3mai2eh.
23. Lusardi, supra note 13.
24. Economic benefit from the World Cup includes money earned from
high tourist volume and ticket sales. See Devesh Mamtani, What Did Russia
Gain From the World Cup?, ALBAWABA (July 12, 2018),
https://www.albawaba.com/business/what-did-russia-gain-world-cup-
1158408.
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burdens placed on host countries in preparation for the tour-
nament, specifically the legislative issues that arise when host
countries have to supplement or change domestic laws in order
to accommodate FIFA’s rigid intellectual property regulations.
Much of the analysis will be on FIFA’s brand protection regime
and the rights held by FIFA.
25
Part III will illustrate these leg-
islative issues by discussing the World Cup as it compares to
the Olympic Games and the similar issues facing the Interna-
tional Olympics Committee (IOC) and Olympic Games host
countries. Finally, Part IV will propose solutions that ease the
burdens placed on host countries by FIFA’s intellectual proper-
ty regulations and provide for an effective platform to com-
municate regarding local legislative matters.
This Note concludes that FIFA’s strict and hefty regulations
26
place great burdens and pressures on any country chosen to
host a World Cup. Countries are forced to amend or enact laws
that include strong intellectual property protection for FIFA.
27
By implementing a new committee to handle all legislative
matters in tandem with the selected host country and incorpo-
rating new provisions into international intellectual property
treaties, FIFA and host countries can progressively diminish
these burdens and strengthen communication to tackle legal
matters pertaining to hosting the World Cup.
I. THEGLOBAL REACH OF FIFA AND CURRENT INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AGREEMENTS
FIFA’s background and the requirements it mandates for
hosting the World Cup are important in identifying FIFA’s in-
ternational influence in the global sports and media industries.
The role of intellectual property treaties and agreements, in
terms of international copyright and trademark protection be-
tween all signatories, is also crucial in identifying how global
protection is granted today in the realm of sports.
28
25. See GUIDELINES FOR THE USE OF FIFA’SOFFICIALMARKS, supra note 22.
26. GUIDE TO THE BIDDING PROCESS FOR THE 2026 FIFA WORLD CUP, supra
note 6.
27. Id; Lusardi, supra note 13.
28. Sport and Intellectual Property, WIPO, https://www.wipo.int/ip-
sport/en/ (last visited Aug. 26, 2019).
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A. The Structure of FIFA and the Requirements for Hosting the
World Cup
The world’s most popular sport has continued to exert its
dominance globally, maintaining steady viewership growth in
both developed and developing countries alike.
29
With 211 par-
ticipating member countries,
30
FIFA has spread its brand far
and wide while maintaining a high revenue stream.
31
Hosting
the World Cup is a privilege, but it comes at great expense; to
illustrate, Russia spent over $14 billion to host the 2018 tour-
nament, well over the predicted cost of $11 billion.
32
FIFA is a non-profit association headquartered in Switzer-
land with a stated goal of “the constant improvement of foot-
ball,” which includes providing access to the sport worldwide.
33
FIFA also has its own codified law, the FIFA Statutes, which
govern the organization and its structure.
34
The FIFA presi-
dent is the highest ranking official and acts as FIFA’s repre-
sentative in all international football matters.
35
The FIFA Con-
gress is the “supreme body” that is tasked with developing the
game and conducting all legislative matters that pertain to the
sport and FIFA’s members.
36
There are many standing commit-
tees that assist both the Congress and the president in their
respective domains, such as the governance committee, finance
committee, and organizing committee for FIFA competitions.
37
29. Ira Boudway, Soccer is the World’s Most Popular Sport and Still Grow-
ing, BLOOMBERG (June 12, 2018),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-06-12/soccer-is-the-world-s-
most-popular-sport-and-still-growing.
30. About FIFA, supra note 3.
31. See Nathan Reiff, How Does FIFA Make Money?, INVESTOPEDIA (July
30, 2019), https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/070915/how-does-
fifa-make-money.asp.
32. This is based on calculations made by the RBC business portal, a Rus-
sian news network. Russia’s World Cup Costs to Exceed $14Bln, Media Re-
ports, MOSCOW TIMES (June 8, 2018),
https://themoscowtimes.com/news/Russias-World-Cup-Costs-to-Exceed-
Record-Setting-14Bln-61732.
33. About FIFA, supra note 3.
34. How FIFA Works, FIFA, https://www.fifa.com/governance/how-fifa-
works/index.html (last visited Aug. 26, 2019).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. FIFA, FIFA STATUTES 46 (June 2019 Edition),
https://resources.fifa.com/image/upload/fifa-statutes-5-august-2019-
en.pdf?cloudid=ggyamhxxv8jrdfbekrrm.
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The statutes provide specific definitions pertaining to every
role within the organization and briefly describe the regula-
tions governing the application of the statutes themselves.
38
Members are the designated football associations of a given
country that agree to comply with all of FIFA’s rules and any
decisions made by a committee or the Congress.
39
A member
association is defined in the statutes as “an association that
has been admitted into membership of FIFA” through a vote by
the Congress.
40
These member associations have numerous ob-
ligations, including to “ratify statutes that are in accordance
with the requirements of the FIFA Standard Statutes” and fol-
low every one of FIFA’s rules.
41
Pursuant to this obligation, a
member association must ensure that their country’s legisla-
tion conforms with the regulations set by FIFA.
42
A member
association that violates any of these obligations may be sub-
ject to disciplinary measures, including a reprimand or fine.
43
FIFA’s marketing is one of its key components when planning
the World Cup, and its intellectual property rights are what
protect the prominent FIFA brand.
44
These rights affect every
member association and, arguably, every country in the
world.
45
Although each member association has its own com-
mercial and intellectual property rights for their own national
teams or competitions, they are still subject to all the rights
held by FIFA.
46
Beyond the individual member associations,
FIFA also extends its rights to different entities of various in-
dustries and refers to them as “Rights Holders.”
47
These enti-
38. There are separate manuals and documents that go in-depth on these
regulations, such as the rules of the game and the requirements of FIFA
member associations. See id. at 37²58.
39. Id. at 18.
40. Id. at 11.
41. Id. at 18.
42. FIFA, FIFA STANDARD COOPERATION AGREEMENT 6 (2007),
https://resources.fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/administration/75/81/23/
standard_cooperation_agreement_efsd_47345.pdf.
43. FIFA STATUTES, supra note 37, at 59.
44. FIFA’s Brand Protection, FIFA, https://www.fifa.com/about-
fifa/marketing/brand-protection/index.html (last visited Aug. 26, 2019).
45. Because the Internet has a complete global reach, and imports and
exports of goods flow continuously, it can be said that FIFA’s brand has
spread worldwide. See id.
46. FIFA STANDARDCOOPERATIONAGREEMENT, supra note 42, at 20.
47. GUIDELINES FOR THE USE OF FIFA’S OFFICIAL MARKS, supra note 22, at
7.
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ties are generally granted commercial rights in the form of me-
dia or advertising during official FIFA events and World Cup
tournaments.
48
Media rights can be limited to a particular ter-
ritory under FIFA’s discretion and include the privilege of us-
ing the brand in television, radio, or any sort of digital trans-
mission.
49
Rights Holders can also be granted the right to sell
official FIFA licensed products,
50
such as football jerseys, balls,
or posters.
51
Rights Holders provide a significant amount of support to
FIFA because they invest in events solely to be granted the ex-
clusive right to use the brand or any official marks.
52
Without
brand protection and exclusivity for Rights Holders, the ac-
quired rights would be significantly diluted and subsequently
there would be less interest in becoming a Rights Holder.
53
Large partners that are granted the most comprehensive pack-
ages in global rights, such as Adidas or Coca-Cola,
54
would not
invest as much money into FIFA events if their profits were
threatened.
55
As such, FIFA ensures that intellectual property
laws, specifically those addressing copyright and trademark,
protect its brand and any official marks in a country where
these marks would appear for a significant period of time.
56
Both Rights Holders and member associations have a higher
duty to abide by FIFA’s rules when a World Cup is in session,
as that is the time when both FIFA and host countries earn the
highest revenue during a tournament season.
57
48. Id.
49. Transmission rights are defined as broadband rights, IPTV transmis-
sion rights, and mobile transmission rights. Id. at 8.
50. Id.
51. Retail & Merchandising, FIFA, https://www.fifa.com/about-
fifa/marketing/licensing/consumer-retail.html (last visited Aug. 26, 2019).
52. FIFA defines its official marks as “a range of logos, words, titles, sym-
bols and other asset/brands/identifiers which are used in connection with the
Event (¶Official Marks’).” GUIDELINES FOR THE USE OF FIFA’S OFFICIAL MARKS,
supra note 22, at 6.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 7.
55. Id. at 6.
56. Id. at 10.
57. GUIDE TO THE BIDDING PROCESS FOR THE 2026 FIFA WORLD CUP, supra
note 6.
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Any member association may host the World Cup.
58
In doing
so, that country agrees to abide by the requirements, including
FIFA’s particularly rigid media and marketing rights.
59
One of
the organization’s main goals is to prevent ambush marketing,
which it defines as an effort to gain an unauthorized associa-
tion with the World Cup for commercial purposes or to exploit
the publicity and marketing generated by official events.
60
En-
forcing these regulations allows for FIFA to continue receiving
generous funds from official commercial affiliates and Rights
Holders or licensees, a large portion of which also provide reve-
nue for member associations.
61
FIFA also places strong empha-
sis on its commercial rights to ensure full cooperation by mem-
ber associations and Rights Holders.
62
These rights are de-
scribed as “exclusively and solely owned and controlled, on a
worldwide basis,” by FIFA.
63
In addition to explaining the purpose of having rigid media
and marketing regulations, FIFA stresses that all member as-
sociations must strictly comply with any and all terms outlined
in the regulations, or else FIFA may impose disciplinary
measures.
64
Compliance with the regulations includes restrict-
ing any member association, regardless of participation in the
World Cup, from using any of FIFA’s media, marketing, or in-
tellectual property rights, unless explicitly allowed.
65
The most
stringent of these regulations requires member associations to
enable FIFA to freely utilize any of these rights within its
country’s territory.
66
Member countries must comply by alter-
ing local or national laws in a timely manner so as to not hin-
58. A member association cannot host the World Cup if either of the previ-
ous two tournaments has taken place on that given continent. Rotation ends
in 2018, FIFA (Oct. 29, 2007), https://www.fifa.com/worldcup/news/rotation-
ends-2018-625122.
59. FIFA, MEDIA AND MARKETING REGULATIONS FOR THE 2018 FIFA WORLD
CUP (2018), https://resources.fifa.com/image/upload/media-and-marketing-
regulations-for-the-2018-fifa-world-cup-
2922838.pdf?cloudid=dbibgs0syrpkdbzbgbxr.
60. An example of this is would be if a local sports clothing store started
selling shirts during the World Cup near one of the arenas hosting a match
and promoting the shirts as “World Cup merchandise.” Id. at 7.
61. Id. at 14.
62. Id. at 15.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 17.
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der FIFA.
67
In addition to this regulation, member countries
are required to immediately notify FIFA if they have any
knowledge of infringement, effectively positioning member as-
sociations to act as a sort of police or law enforcement unit to
protect against any kind of infringement that would diminish
the commercial value of the World Cup.
68
In efforts to further
protect itself and relinquish as many burdens as possible, FIFA
waives all liability for any costs or damages associated with, or
that may result from, the requirements set forth in the media
and marketing regulations.
69
B. International Intellectual Property Agreements
The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) is a
United Nations agency with 191 member states that addresses
intellectual property matters on the international level.
70
The
two major WIPO treaties regarding copyright and trademark
protection are the Berne Convention
71
and the Paris Conven-
tion.
72
These treaties were implemented in an effort to increase
harmonization amongst signatory members and provide better
protection for people and entities as goods and services are im-
67. It is important to note that FIFA requires any and all costs or financial
obligations associated with this process to be paid by the member associa-
tions. Id. The members must also handle all clearances or documents re-
quired by the state’s judicial or legislative bodies, in accordance with FIFA’s
instructions. Id.
68. Id. at 20.
69. Id. at 48.
70. About WIPO, WIPO, http://www.wipo.int/about-wipo/en/ (last visited
Aug. 26, 2019).
71. The Berne Convention was established in 1886. Berne Convention for
the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, as revised at
Stockholm on July 14, 1967, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Berne Conven-
tion]. For a summary of the convention see Summary of the Berne Convention
for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (1886), WIPO,
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/berne/summary_berne.html (last visited
Aug. 26, 2019).
72. The Paris Convention was established in 1883. Paris Convention for
the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, 21 U.S.T. 1583 828
U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter Paris Convention]. For a summary of the conven-
tion see
Summary of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property
(1883), WIPO, http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/paris/summary_paris.html
(last visited Aug. 26, 2019).
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ported and exported across the globe.
73
At the core of both the
Berne Convention and the Paris Convention is the principle of
national treatment, which posits that all signatory states must
accord the same intellectual property rights to the citizens of
other nations as they would for their own.
74
Since their incep-
tion, the Paris Convention and the Berne Convention have es-
tablished the minimum standards of protection in their respec-
tive intellectual property fields and have continued to adapt to
the modern age of technology.
75
The Paris Convention protects industrial property, such as
trademarks or patents, and aims to limit unfair competition.
76
In regards to trademarks, protection must be granted across all
signatory states if a trademark has been properly registered in
the country of origin.
77
Registration and use of a trademark,
however, will be refused if it infringes on the rights of another
person or entity, or if it is an attempt to reproduce or imitate
an already registered mark.
78
Although trademark registration
generally lasts for a period of ten years, renewal can be granted
indefinitely.
79
Currently, trademark owners can more easily
seek protection at the international level by using WIPO’s Ma-
drid System, which only requires one application for protection
in up to the 122 countries that are members of the Madrid Sys-
tem.
80
73. See Summary of the Berne Convention, supra note 71; Summary of the
Paris Convention, supra note 72. See also Andrew Larrick, Resource Guide for
Researching Intellectual Property Law in an International Context Sec. 2
(June 2008),
http://library.law.columbia.edu/guides/International_Intellectual_Property.
74. Berne Convention, supra note 71; Paris Convention, supra note 72;
Larrick, supra note 73, at Sec. 2.2.
75. Larrick, supra note 73, at Sec. 2.4.
76. Summary of the Paris Convention, supra note 72.
77. Id.
78. Reproduction or imitation of an already existing trademark would like-
ly cause confusion, thus impacting the economic influence and property rights
of the trademark owner. Id.
79. Trademarks, WIPO, http://www.wipo.int/trademarks/en/ (last visited
Aug. 26, 2019).
80. The Madrid System allows for a more convenient way to register
trademarks worldwide by requiring only a single application for protection in
up to the 122 countries that are signatories to the System. Madrid - The In-
ternational Trademark System, WIPO, http://www.wipo.int/madrid/en/ (last
visited Aug. 26, 2019).
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The Berne Convention protects all artistic works and the
rights of authors, such as the right to reproduce and the right
to broadcast.
81
Protection is granted for copyrighted works in
every “literary, scientific and artistic domain, whatever the
mode or form of its expression,” and the author receives com-
plete and exclusive rights to that copyright.
82
An author is also
given moral rights to their copyright, which entails the right to
object to any action that would prejudice the author’s reputa-
tion.
83
While both the Berne Convention and the Paris Convention
outline the registration and protection of intellectual proper-
ty,
84
the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (the “TRIPS Agreement”) provides for a more
extensive system of these rights.
85
The TRIPS Agreement is the
leading and most comprehensive international trading agree-
ment to date on intellectual property.
86
In setting the stand-
ards of the TRIPS Agreement, the WTO acknowledged the ex-
isting WIPO conventions by requiring all signatory states of
the TRIPS Agreement to comply with the obligations set forth
in the Berne Convention and the Paris Convention.
87
The WTO
refers to the TRIPS Agreement as a “Berne and Paris-plus
agreement” because of the substantial number of obligations
added to it on matters or issues where the two conventions “are
silent or were seen as inadequate,” thus broadening the reach
of the TRIPS Agreement.
88
81. Berne Convention, supra note 71, art. 2; see also Summary of the Berne
Convention, supra note 71.
82. Berne Convention, supra note 71, art. 2.
83. Id. at art. 6bis.
84. Summary of the Berne Convention, supra note 71; Summary of the Par-
is Convention, supra note 72.
85. Intellectual Property: Protection and Enforcement, WTO,
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm7_e.htm (last visit-
ed Aug. 26, 2019).
86. The TRIPS Agreement was established by the WTO and came into
effect in 1995. Overview: the TRIPS Agreement, WTO,
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/intel2_e.htm (last visited Aug.
26, 2019).
Currently, all member states of the WTO are signatories to the TRIPS
Agreement. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
87. Overview: TRIPS, supra note 86.
88. Id.
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Another important element of the TRIPS Agreement is the
enforcement of intellectual property rights.
89
The TRIPS
Agreement specifies, in great detail, the procedures and reme-
dies that signatory states must make available so that every
registrant can enforce their rights within their domestic terri-
tory, including both civil and criminal procedures.
90
The objec-
tives of the TRIPS Agreement are plenty, including “the reduc-
tion of distortions and impediments to international trade,
promotion of effective and adequate protection of intellectual
property rights,” thus ensuring that barriers to legitimate in-
ternational trade are not erected.
91
II. LEGISLATIVE BURDENS ONHOST COUNTRIES
FIFA’s increased focus on protecting its intellectual property
rights has shifted the burden onto host countries, as infringe-
ments and ambush marketing tactics continue to pose substan-
tial risks during every World Cup.
92
As a result, FIFA holds an
“unhealthy grip on the host nation’s legislation, authorities and
judicial process” in order to keep revenue as high as possible
and to ensure countries make every effort to protect FIFA’s
brand.
93
A. The Effects of Ambush Marketing on Brand Protection
FIFA continues to place heavy burdens on the legislative and
even judicial processes of World Cup host countries in an effort
to protect its brand during the tournament season.
94
The main
reason behind FIFA’s efforts is to prevent third parties from
taking advantage of the extensive media coverage that occurs
during the World Cup, particularly because of how tempting it
is to “piggyback” off of the international attention.
95
Ambush
89. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 86; Overview: TRIPS, supra note 86.
90. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 86, art. 41; Overview: TRIPS, supra note
86.
91. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 86; Overview: TRIPS, supra note 86.
92. See Jack Blakey, Ambush Marketing and the 2018 FIFA World Cup,
SQUIRE PATTON BOGGS (June 25, 2018),
https://www.sports.legal/2018/06/ambush-marketing-and-the-2018-fifa-world-
cup/.
93. David Cran & Simon Griffiths, Ambush Marketing: Unsporting Behav-
ior or Fair Play?, 21 ENT. L. REV. 293, 297 (2010).
94. Id. at 294.
95. Blakey, supra note 92.
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marketing threatens the media and marketing revenues FIFA
and its sponsors earn during each tournament because unaffil-
iated parties and brands create a “commercial connection or
association with the event despite no official link,” which leads
to the devaluation of FIFA’s intellectual property rights and
exclusivity paid for by official sponsors.
96
Ambush marketing poses a greater threat with each passing
World Cup.
97
There are three types of ambush marketing driv-
ing the existence of strict media and marketing regulations,
which are (1) ambush by association, (2) ambush by intrusion,
and (3) opportunistic advertising.
98
The first, ambush by asso-
ciation, involves a third party or non-sponsoring brand that at-
tempts to market itself as one of the official sponsors of the
competition.
99
This is usually done when the entity associates
its brand with one of the parties present at the tournament,
such as a country or player.
100
An example of ambush by asso-
ciation took place during the 2014 World Cup in Brazil when
the brand ¶Beats by Dre’ advertised its headphone product by
featuring famous football players wearing the headphones,
which led to such high viewership that the brand saw a 130
percent growth in its revenue.
101
The second type, ambush by intrusion, occurs when a non-
sponsoring party attempts to gain attention at the event itself
through actions like giving out free goods or placing signs in
and around the venue.
102
A famous example of this happened
during the 2010 World Cup in South Africa when the company
Bavaria Beer paid a large group of women to wear orange out-
fits displaying the brand at one of the most popular matches in
order to garner attention and free advertising when the camer-
as were facing them.
103
This type of ambush marketing caught
the attention of the media when FIFA removed the women
from the stadium, questioned them about the company’s in-
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
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volvement, and subsequently charged two women with violat-
ing the Merchandise Marks Act of South Africa.
104
Finally, the third and least common of the three types of am-
bush marketing, opportunistic advertising, occurs when a non-
sponsor indirectly refers to the tournament.
105
One relatively
recent example of this took place during the 2012 London
Olympics, when the company Paddy Power utilized a tongue-
in-cheek advertising technique by posting an advertisement
with the misleading slogan, “official sponsor of the largest ath-
letics event in London this year!”
106
Interestingly enough, the
IOC failed in its efforts to remove the advertisement because
Paddy Power did host a sporting event, although it was held in
London, France not London, England.
107
It has become increas-
ingly clear that ambush marketing has profound negative ef-
fects on the brand protection of large international sport organ-
izations and is often found in “sneaky” forms of advertising.
108
B. The Role Host Countries Play in FIFA’s Brand Protection
Regime
Since citizens from almost every country around the globe
tune in to watch the World Cup, FIFA is continuously faced
with the challenge of ensuring brand protection across different
jurisdictions, all of which contain their own set of intellectual
property legislation.
109
If a country that is trying to become a
host already has substantial legislation on the matter, then
FIFA requires that country to detail how those laws or regula-
tions will protect FIFA’s rights during the World Cup.
110
If that
is not the case, then FIFA strictly mandates that host countries
enact specific legislation to address anti²ambush marketing
tactics and provide for the highest level of protection for
FIFA.
111
This type of legislation is uniquely time-barred, mean-
104. The Merchandise Marks Act was one of the specific intellectual proper-
ty acts implemented by South Africa to comply with FIFA’s strict media and
marketing regulations for the 2010 World Cup. Cran & Griffiths, supra note
93, at 295.
105. Blakey, supra note 92.
106. Id.
107. The sporting event was an egg and spoon race. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Intellectual property rights protection is one of the main goals of FIFA
because almost thirty percent of the organization’s revenue is generated
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ing the relevant law is only applicable to the year that the
World Cup takes place.
112
For example, Brazil enacted legisla-
tion in 2014 that made it illegal for non-sponsors to engage in
ambush marketing specifically targeting the tournament, and
that offense was no longer in existence after 2014.
113
This is
one of the major reasons why host countries are chosen years in
advance, so that FIFA has time to engage in a “rights protec-
tion programme,” and follow through with any registrations or
documents needed for its brand, such as copyright or trade-
mark registrations.
114
A major issue that has repeatedly developed related to this
kind of legislation is determining how to strike the right bal-
ance between corporate interests and freedom of public or
commercial expression.
115
In regards to corporate interests, it is
clear that FIFA intends to gain as much benefit from each
World Cup as possible, and one of its most noticeable methods
to achieve this end is to demand a tax-free “status” in the host
country during the time when the tournament is being promot-
ed and in session.
116
By removing opportunities for the host
country and its nationals to earn profit, FIFA severely limits
that freedom of public and commercial expression, particularly
with the restrictions placed on intellectual property registra-
tions and advertisements.
117
Balancing these two interests has
proven to be increasingly difficult through the consistent en-
actments of specific laws and regulations designed to shift the
balance to heavily favor FIFA.
118
The 2018 World Cup in Russia is the most recent example of
the impact FIFA has on domestic brand protection²related leg-
through marketing and media-related efforts. Claire Jones, Turf Wars: IP
and the FIFA World Cup 2018, NOVAGRAAF (Mar. 27, 2018),
https://www.novagraaf.com/en/insights/turf-wars-ip-and-fifa-world-cup-2018.
112. Blakey, supra note 92.
113. Id.
114. Cran & Griffiths, supra note 93, at 294.
115. Id. at 293.
116. Id. at 297.
117. Id. at 294.
118. Lucy Walker, 2018 World Cup: FIFA’s Determined to Keep Ambush
Marketing on the Bench, BARKER BRETTELL (June 27, 2018),
https://www.barkerbrettell.co.uk/2018-world-cup-fifas-determined-to-keep-
ambush-marketing-on-the-bench/.
2019] Kicking the Law 317
islation and the subsequent shift in FIFA’s economic favor.
119
In 2013, Russia both adopted and amended laws to encompass
a broad array of intellectual property and advertisement legis-
lation in order to comply with FIFA’s requirements, with the
main law titled the “Federal Law on the preparation for and
observance in the Russian Federation, the FIFA World Cup
2018 year FIFA Confederations Cup 2017 year and amend-
ments to certain legislative acts of the Russian Federation”
(“Russian World Cup Law”).
120
For the World Cup specifically,
the federal law recognized FIFA’s exclusive rights solely for
that year and highlighted strict new provisions.
121
Articles 17
and 55 of the Russian World Cup Law prohibited the use of all
Russian trademarks that were identical or similar to any regis-
tered or promoted FIFA mark.
122
These provisions were intend-
ed to limit unfair competition and prevent consumers from be-
ing misled, while also giving FIFA trademarks priority over
any other trademarks during that time.
123
Rospatent, the Rus-
sian Federal Service for Intellectual Property,
124
also played a
large role for FIFA by creating an easy and quick method for
FIFA to register or license any marks during the World Cup.
125
As to the new provisions related to advertisement, Articles 18
and 51 of the Russian World Cup Law gave FIFA the exclusive
right throughout the World Cup to control the placement of ad-
vertisements within two kilometers of the stadiums where the
games were held.
126
This measured distance referred to both
physical land area and airspace, giving FIFA an all-
encompassing reach to any nearby implementations of com-
119. Schmitt & Orlov, 2018 FIFA World Cup’s Impact on Russian IP and
Advertisement Legislation, LEXOLOGY (June 6, 2017),
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=f641a457-a4d8-4e98-84f7-
c65e3d26cb09.
120. The full title of the federal law was “Federal Law on the preparation
for and observance in the Russian Federation, the FIFA World Cup 2018
year, FIFA Confederations Cup 2017 year and amendments to certain legis-
lative acts of the Russian Federation”. Id.
121. Id.
122. The similar or identical Russian trademarks were prohibited until De-
cember 31, 2018. Id.
123. Id.
124. About Rospatent, ROSPATENT, https://rupto.ru/en/about (last visited
Aug. 26, 2019).
125. Schmitt & Orlov, supra note 119.
126. Id.
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mercial advertising both digitally and physically.
127
Russia re-
ferred to commercial advertising as “trading activities” and
made it clear in the provisions that any such trading activities
within the two-kilometer radius needed written consent from
FIFA.
128
The burdens placed on Russia are merely one example of
FIFA’s determination to protect itself from ambush marketing,
as many of the issues present during the 2018 World Cup in
Russia were also present in other countries.
129
During the 2010
World Cup, the host country, South Africa, implemented laws
specific to both the tournament and FIFA as a supplement to
the strong existing legislation regarding intellectual property
protection.
130
The most notable law created was the 2010 FIFA
World Cup Special Measures Act, which granted permission to
official sponsors to advertise in “exclusion zones” and allowed
existing businesses to carry on their commercial activities
without government or FIFA interference.
131
The Trade Prac-
tices Act of 1974 in South Africa was similar to the Russian
World Cup Law in that it prohibited third parties from using
marks or phrases that created or implied a connection to the
World Cup, FIFA, or official sponsors.
132
Along with those two
acts, South Africa also amended the Merchandise Marks Act
and enacted the Sponsorship Code of the Advertising Stand-
ards Authority of South Africa, demonstrating the considerable
amount of effort put towards complying with FIFA’s strict re-
quirements.
133
A notable exception to this trend occurred in
2006, when Germany did not enact or amend any legislation for
the 2006 World Cup because the country already had strong
unfair competition laws that were in compliance.
134
Although much, if not all, of the legislation enacted or
amended by various World Cup host countries only apply for
the given World Cup year, hosts are still burdened with the re-
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Cran & Griffiths, supra note 93, at 295.
130. Id.
131. The “exclusion zones” set specific parameters near certain stadiums
where unassociated businesses and unofficial advertisers were allowed to
promote and sell their goods without infringing on FIFA’s rights. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
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quirement of ensuring that all protections mandated by FIFA
are in place, which is certainly not an effortless task.
135
Due to
these measures, any unauthorized uses of protected marks,
such as copyright infringement or violations of the specific
World Cup-related laws, lead to civil, administrative, or crimi-
nal liability in the host country, which compounds the issue of
draining domestic resources to protect FIFA.
136
Brazil did not
have any specific or detailed legislation on ambush marketing
prior to the 2014 World Cup and subsequently spent a consid-
erable amount of time creating the General Law on the World
Cup legislation (the “General Law”).
137
Although the General
Law was seen as a “positive step” toward addressing the need
for greater intellectual property and brand security throughout
the country, it expired at the end of 2014 and was only limited
to FIFA.
138
FIFA’s influential grip on Brazil did not allow for
other businesses or entities to benefit from the legislation be-
cause of the narrow nature of the law.
139
Brazil acted similarly to South Africa and Russia by also im-
plementing a law prohibiting the registration of marks or sym-
bols that would likely confuse consumers, in compliance with
FIFA’s demands to prevent ambush marketing and unfair
competition.
140
Brazil’s World Cup Law provided for criminal
liabilities to strengthen FIFA’s protection, such as a one-year
imprisonment sentence.
141
The Brazilian law also granted FIFA
the right to apply for injunctions directly to Brazilian courts as
a more expedited method to receive monetary damages or in-
135. Blakey, supra note 92.
136. Yuriy Korchuganov, Russia Federation: FIFA 2018 World Cup and
Advertising Restrictions, MONDAQ (Oct. 27, 2017),
http://www.mondaq.com/russianfederation/x/640786/advertising+marketing+
branding/FIFA+2018+World+Cup+And+Advertising+Restrictions.
137. Jose Eduardo Pieri, Ambush Marketing Laws: A Legacy of the 2014
FIFA World Cup in Brazil, INTA (Sept. 23, 2014),
https://www.inta.org/INTABlog/Lists/Posts/Post.aspx?ID=107#.W-esBydRfVo.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Poonam Majithia, How Successful Were FIFA and Its Sponsors at Pro-
tecting Their Brands During the World Cup?, LAWINSPORT (Aug. 13, 2014),
https://www.lawinsport.com/topics/articles/intellectual-property-
law/item/how-successful-were-fifa-and-its-sponsors-at-protecting-their-
brands-during-the-world-cup.
141. Id.
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junctions.
142
Brazil described its efforts in creating this law as a
means to protect “the goodwill and positive image generated by
the FIFA World Cup,” directly aligning itself with the brand
protection goals articulated by FIFA.
143
As FIFA and its official
sponsors continue to benefit from the extensive protections
provided through host countries’ legislative efforts, there re-
mains the question of whether these laws and regulations se-
verely limit the freedom of public expression in favor of com-
mercial interests.
144
III. THEOLYMPICGAMES COMPARISON AND HOW FIFA SETS A
MORE RIGOROUS STANDARD
Along with the World Cup, the Olympic Games feature an-
other leading international sporting event that takes place in
different host countries.
145
The IOC is similar to FIFA in that
most of the revenue it generates is from marketing programs
and intellectual property rights, including by sharing or selling
rights to official sponsors and partners.
146
The IOC is similarly
faced with the challenges associated with ambush marketing,
especially because legal remedies are still limited when no spe-
cific laws are in place to protect these entities and official
Olympic Games sponsors.
147
Legislation related to anti-
ambushing or anti-infringing was first implemented by an
Olympic Games host in Australia during the 2000 Olympic
Games, proving successful for both Australia and the IOC.
148
This was a major catalyst for the IOC to begin requiring that
host countries enact legislation to protect against ambush
142. Kevin Carpenter & Louise Millington-Roberts, What are the Risks and
Opportunities for Ambush Marketers at the FIFA World Cup Brazil?,
LAWINSPORT (June 24, 2014), https://www.lawinsport.com/content/blog/kevin-
carpenter/item/what-are-the-risk-and-opportunities-for-ambush-marketers-
at-the-fifa-world-cup-brazil.
143. Id.
144. Blakey, supra note 92.
145. The Olympic Games, HIST. (Aug. 21, 2018),
https://www.history.com/topics/sports/olympic-games.
146. See The International Olympic Committee, OLYMPIC GAMES,
https://www.olympic.org/the-ioc (last visited Aug. 26, 2019).
147. See generally Nicole Vidinu, Playing by the Rules – Ambush Marketing
and the Olympic Games, SMART & BIGGAR FETHERSTONHAUGH (July 6, 2016),
http://www.smart-biggar.com/en/articles_print.cfm?news_id=1141.
148. The law was titled “Sydney 2000 Games (Indicia and Images Protec-
tion) Act 1996.” Id.
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marketing, thus creating the growing trend of protecting the
intellectual property rights held by the IOC and any officially
affiliated sponsors.
149
While both the IOC and FIFA have evi-
dently been combating ambush marketing by implementing
similar requirements, FIFA has continued to set a more rigor-
ous standard than the IOC. FIFA can benefit from looking at
how the IOC details its requirements and the language that
the IOC uses when collaborating with host countries.
The 2016 Olympic Games in Brazil enacted a specific and
time-barred law for the event, titled the Olympic Act.
150
Brazil
enacted this temporary law in an effort to prevent unfair com-
petition from unassociated uses of official Olympic marks and
expressions,
151
which was similar to the initiative it had taken
two years prior while hosting the 2014 World Cup.
152
In its
Brand Protection Guidelines for the 2016 Olympics, the IOC
stated that protection must be a requirement in order to “pre-
serve the emotional and commercial value of the brands” and
emphasized the importance of its official partners.
153
Given
that the IOC is a non-profit organization, it demonstrates its
intellectual property through elements representing the “iden-
tity of the Games” and the values of the organization.
154
The
marks and expressions associated with the Olympic Games are
much more expansive than those of FIFA because of the large
variety of sports played during the Olympic Games.
155
The IOC
describes ambush marketing similarly to FIFA because am-
bush marketing negatively affects the Olympics just as much
as the World Cup due to the large-scale events thriving on the
investments of official partners and sponsors.
156
The striking difference between FIFA and the IOC, however,
is the IOC’s language when outlining the requirement for host
countries to enact legislation. The IOC suggests a less aggres-
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Pieri, supra note 137.
153. ORGANIZING COMMITTEE FOR THE OLYMPIC AND PARALYMPIC GAMES IN
RIO IN 2016, BRAND PROTECTION GUIDELINES 8 (2014),
https://library.olympic.org/Default/doc/SYRACUSE/76211/brand-protection-
guidelines-advertising-market-and-advertisers-organising-committee-for-the-
olympic-?_lg=en-GB.
154. Id. at 12.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 42.
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sive tone than FIFA, such as explaining the requirement as a
“commitment to protect” its intellectual property,
157
whereas
FIFA describes the need to protect the intellectual property
rights as “crucial for staging the event.”
158
For the 2016 Olym-
pic Games, Brazil swiftly followed the IOC’s protocol and en-
acted specific rules to comply with its commitment to the IOC,
including the Federal Olympic Act, State Olympic Act, and
Municipal Olympic Act.
159
The IOC, in turn, added further pro-
tection by stating all its rights are registered worldwide.
160
Not
many differences exist between the World Cup and the Olym-
pic Games in this regard, as ambush marketing is prevalent
during both tournaments and each host country has different
legislative approaches to intellectual property laws.
161
Much of
the specific legislation put in place for both events have been
time-barred to only the year the event occurs, but legislation
for the Olympic Games seems to have a shorter expiration than
the equivalent laws for the World Cup, as seen when the Lon-
don Olympic Association Right expired soon after the Olympic
Games ended.
162
In contrast, both Russia and Brazil extended
their legislation for the World Cup until the end of the year, as
FIFA employed a stricter regime for compliance with its brand
protection rules.
163
The negative impacts of the IOC’s requirements, similarly to
FIFA, widen the gap between freedom of expression and com-
mercial interests by giving almost complete control to these in-
fluential entities that organize the large-scale events and
commercial associations.
164
As a result, outside brands and the
general public fail to understand what constitutes an offense or
a violation of these laws because of the wide array of marks,
157. Id. at 44.
158. GUIDELINES FOR THE USE OF FIFA’SOFFICIALMARKS, supra note 22.
159. Id. at 45.
160. Id.
161. Blakey, supra note 92.
162. The London Olympic Games took place in 2012. Id. The London Olym-
pic Association Right was part of the London Olympic Games and Paralympic
Games Act 2006. Id.
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164. Benoit Seguin & Teresa Scassa, Ambush Marketing Legislation to Pro-
tect Olympic Sponsors: A Step Too Far in the Name of Brand Protection?, in
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APPROACHES 513 (B. Courtney Doagoo et al. eds., 2014).
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symbols, and expressions associated with the IOC.
165
Another
consequence is that the rights of the public and athletes partic-
ipating in the event are repeatedly infringed.
166
This confusing
language in the legislation puts non-IOC sponsors at substan-
tial risk of having their profits reduced while also limiting their
ability to be creative and innovative.
167
For the IOC, the large
amount of stakeholders and sponsors for each Olympic Games
influences the organization to push for stronger intellectual
property²based legislation and grant further privileges to con-
tributors in order to secure the necessary revenue to fund the
event.
168
Violations certainly do not go unnoticed as officials for
the IOC and affiliated associations will send infringement no-
tices to both large and small businesses, such as local bars,
bakeries, and even charities.
169
Looking forward, the IOC is continuing to expand its protec-
tions against ambush marketing by creating, well in advance,
the Brand Protection Guidelines for the Tokyo 2020 Olympic
Games (the “Guidelines”).
170
The Organizing Committee in Ja-
pan is handling the intellectual property associated with the
Olympic Games, including, among other goals, the utilization
of necessary marketing strategies to secure revenue and ade-
quately prepare for the event.
171
In a similar fashion, the
Guidelines outline and define ambush marketing while focus-
ing on the risk of reduced funding if any infringement or am-
bush marketing occur.
172
If either were to occur, it would “seri-
ously compromise the operation of the Games and impede ef-
forts to develop the athletes,” as part of the revenue is intended
to go towards the athletes and participating teams.
173
Local sponsors account for twenty-seven percent of the reve-
nue earned through marketing efforts, and the Worldwide
Olympic Partners (“TOP Partners”) account for ten percent of
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. THE TOKYO ORGANISING COMMITTEE OF THE OLYMPIC AND PARALYMPIC
GAMES, BRAND PROTECTION GUIDELINES (2019),
https://tokyo2020.org/en/copyright/data/brand-protection-EN.pdf.
171. The Organizing Committee also aims to secure funds for Japanese ath-
letes as they prepare for the Olympic Games. Id. at 2.
172. Id.
173. Id.
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the revenue.
174
These TOP Partners consist of powerful compa-
nies, such as Toyota, Samsung, and Coca-Cola, that are given
exclusive rights to exploit the intellectual property of the
Olympic Games because of their high contributions.
175
The
broad nature of the IOC’s exclusive intellectual property rights
can be seen through the list of terms to be protected, which in-
cludes simple terms such as “Tokyo 2020” and “Olympics,”
meaning that any unauthorized use or affiliation with these
words or phrases is strictly prohibited and subject to legal ac-
tion.
176
Japan grants legal protection to the IOC through numerous
laws and regulations, most of which have incorporated specific
provisions for the Olympic Games.
177
The Trademark Act,
which could easily apply to the World Cup as well, protects all
registered marks and logos used on goods or services.
178
The
Act highlights criminal charges similar to those imposed by
other Olympic and World Cup host countries against trade-
mark infringers, although the charges seem excessive in Japan
as imprisonment could last up to ten years, and fines could be
as much as ten million yen.
179
The Unfair Competition Preven-
tion Act and the Copyright Act also impose similarly heavy
criminal charges, as both Japan and the IOC recognize how
common it is for these infringement violations to take place.
180
In concluding the Guidelines, the IOC stated that these “mar-
keting activities cannot be established without the protection of
the intellectual property,” which seems to be the foundation for
each brand protection regime for the Olympic Games,
181
as well
as the World Cup.
IV. FIFAMOVING FORWARD: PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
FIFA continues to require host countries to enact legislation
and regulations to protect FIFA’s intellectual property, thus
placing undue burdens on host countries.
182
FIFA must take
174. Id. at 4.
175. Id. at 5.
176. Id. at 9.
177. Id. at 10.
178. Id.
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180. Id. at 11.
181. Id. at 12.
182. Cran & Griffiths, supra note 93, at 294.
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necessary steps to ease these burdens and build a more effec-
tive process for host countries to adequately protect FIFA
against infringements and ambush marketing. A new platform
should also be created to ensure FIFA and host countries com-
municate effectively when preparing for the World Cup. FIFA
must be able to communicate clearly with a host country so as
to minimize ambiguities or unforeseen difficulties. With fewer
burdens, host countries can save time and energy during prep-
arations, which in turn can help FIFA continue to protect its
brand.
A. New FIFA Committee to Handle Temporary Legislative Re-
form
Building a new FIFA committee devoted solely to legislative
issues concerning a World Cup host country would allow for a
productive, communicative platform. In working with such a
committee, the host country would first inform FIFA of its cur-
rent legislation regarding brand protection and intellectual
property. FIFA would then need to familiarize itself with the
unique legal environment of its hosts, as each country sets its
own laws regarding those matters. With adequate information
ahead of time, FIFA can better communicate its requirements
and needs. Through this, communication would be much more
effective, enabling FIFA to address any inconsistencies and de-
ficiencies in domestic legislation.
Another important aspect of the proposed committee would
be to have designated representatives from the host country
who are members of the proper legislative or judicial branch
and who are knowledgeable in the necessary matters concern-
ing hosting a World Cup. FIFA often does not understand the
complexities of each country’s legal landscape, and it would
benefit from specialized guidance. The host country representa-
tives would negotiate with FIFA regarding how to enact or
amend their legislation, such that every party understands
how to comply with FIFA requirements. Furthermore, the
committee would give these representatives a concrete plat-
form for proper discussions to take place.
B. New Provisions in Existing International Agreements
Specific provisions should also be added to international in-
tellectual property agreements to address claims of copyright
or trademark infringements that occur during a World Cup
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season, particularly given FIFA’s strong international reach
and popularity. Any threat to FIFA’s exclusive rights creates
disruptions in revenue for both FIFA and a host country. To
ease the process of acquiring intellectual property registrations
and bringing claims against infringers, these agreements or
treaties can incorporate new provisions that focus on interna-
tional sporting events. These provisions should refer directly to
brand protection, since that is the main issue with infringe-
ments. Including language that describes the well-known
“brand” of an organization or entity provides more protection
because it is inclusive of both copyright and trademark princi-
ples.
Part IV of the TRIPS Agreement outlining the acquisition
and maintenance of intellectual property rights would be an
appropriate place to incorporate this new provision.
183
Signato-
ry members are required to comply with all procedures de-
scribed in the TRIPS Agreement, so adding an article that re-
quires members to maintain FIFA’s intellectual property rights
would be consistent with this obligation.
184
To narrow this fur-
ther, it would be crucial to include a timeframe for which these
provisions would be effective; for example, specifying that the
legislation would only apply during the year the World Cup is
taking place. This grants more flexibility for FIFA and the host
countries to take any necessary actions during the time leading
up to that year. The timeframe would also grant non-host coun-
tries protection when advertising merchandise or services re-
lated to the World Cup.
One difficulty with adding these provisions is how to refer to
FIFA itself. Countries or organizations may oppose including
laws that speak specifically to FIFA, but not to other signifi-
cant international organizations. Despite this concern, it is im-
portant to focus on the fact that FIFA is an incredibly influen-
tial international organization, with over two hundred coun-
tries as active members.
185
Member states are already faced
with the task of adopting FIFA-specific legislation, so incorpo-
rating provisions that refer directly to FIFA would assist coun-
tries that are chosen as future hosts. Although countries might
argue that they will not be chosen as a host for years to come,
183. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 86, art. 62.
184. Id.
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it’s important to consider that FIFA is active in most countries
beyond hosting the World Cup, such as through advertisements
and merchandise sales.
With the World Cup occurring on a consistent four-year ba-
sis, and with the FIFA brand appearing worldwide every day,
adding these specific provisions to international treaties will
prove to be advantageous to every signatory country. Host
countries will have fewer burdens with legislative matters and
more support when dealing with infringements in their territo-
ry. FIFA would also benefit from these provisions because the
organization would garner support from international leading
bodies, such as WIPO and the WTO, while simultaneously pro-
tecting their brand from infringers. Furthermore, FIFA’s work-
load would lessen because there would not be a rush to imple-
ment legislative changes and verify compliance before the
World Cup.
CONCLUSION
The FIFA World Cup continuously generates ever-growing
revenue and viewership, but at a great cost to the country host-
ing the event.
186
FIFA’s strict regulations regarding media and
marketing protection impose heavy burdens on host countries
to amend or add legislation in order to comply and protect
FIFA’s brand.
187
These regulations form a complex relationship
between FIFA and the host countries, as FIFA wields immense
control over the host country and broad authority to regulate
the actions that must occur if the World Cup is to take place in
that country.
The threat of ambush marketing and brand infringements in-
fluences FIFA to implement strict regulations and force host
countries to adapt their domestic legislation accordingly.
188
Creating a new committee within FIFA dedicated to addressing
the legislative needs of host countries in regards to intellectual
property protection would help ease the burdens placed on
these countries while also providing an effective platform for
communication. Additionally, adding specific provisions to ex-
isting international intellectual property agreements would
significantly reduce difficulties related to implementing domes-
186. Cran & Griffiths, supra note 93, at 297.
187. Lusardi, supra note 13.
188. Blakey, supra note 92.
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tic legislation among World Cup host countries. As these host
countries begin to adapt to FIFA’s regulations through a more
efficient process, FIFA can lift legislative burdens while con-
tinuing to advance and improve brand protection.
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